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Crawford’s “Testimonial Hearsay”
Category
A PLAIN LIMIT ON THE PROTECTIONS OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Mark Dwyer †
For those of us who are practitioners, this debate about
the history of the Confrontation Clause might be fascinating.
And it might be fascinating, as well, for us to hear speculation
about where the law might or should go in the future. But we
have to worry primarily about the law now. We practitioners
cannot walk into a courtroom and tell the judge, “Sure there is
Crawford v. Washington, but Justice Scalia got the history
wrong, and so here is how you should let me try my case.” That
does not work. So I start by recognizing the primacy of
Crawford v. Washington. 1 Any time that the Supreme Court
makes that big of a statement, everything past is essentially
irrelevant, and analysis must be based on the new case.
However, while Crawford is important, its impact is not
yet clear. As a practitioner, I do not yet know where the courts
will go in applying Crawford. But I am not persuaded at all
that Crawford applies to the same universe of statements that
was covered by the old Ohio v. Roberts 2 standard. It is
important to look at the language of Crawford, evaluating it in
light of the now-discarded Roberts rule and common law
precedent, to see where Crawford is taking us. In my view,
Justice Scalia’s Crawford opinion actually narrows the scope of
the Confrontation Clause, given its emphasis on the category of
“testimonial” hearsay.
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541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
448 U.S. 56 (1980).

275

276

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

Under the rules of evidence, some out-of-court
Roberts harmonized the
statements are admissible. 3
admissibility of some of those statements with the
Confrontation Clause. In doing so, Roberts threw a thin
protective blanket over all hearsay declarations, but the
blanket was permeable. Under Roberts, hearsay could pass
through the blanket and be admitted in court against a
defendant if considered reliable. 4
Those who tend to favor excluding out-of-court
statements – and that is a very honorable group of people –
were not happy about how much hearsay was admitted under
the Roberts rule. 5 Their examination of history led them to
argue for a new look at the purpose and reach of the
Confrontation Clause. Their approach was in effect endorsed
in Crawford v. Washington. No longer is the protection
provided by the Confrontation Clause a permeable blanket;
now it is a thick lead shield. No hearsay statement gets by the
Confrontation Clause and into court, even if it appears reliable,
unless its maker is subject to cross-examination, 6 with an
exception only when the defendant has made the witness
unavailable for cross-examination. 7
But the triumph of the historically-based argument
underlying Crawford amounts to a devil’s bargain. In order to
get that thick shield against the introduction of hearsay
statements by declarants who have not been cross-examined,
the proponents based their argument on a history in which the
Confrontation Clause did not extend to cover all hearsay
declarations. In that history, the Confrontation Clause is a
shield only against “testimonial hearsay” – a subset of the
whole. 8
Naturally, the people who advocated for the new rule –
those who tend to favor excluding out-of-court statements – are
pleased to see the thick lead shield now in place. And being
human, they want to have their cake and eat it too. So they
3
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 (enumerating twenty-three exceptions to the
hearsay rule).
4
Id. at 66.
5
See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171 (2002); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L. J. 1011 (1998).
6
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
7
Id. at 61 (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.”).
8
Id. at 51.
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have proposed that the new, thick shield should extend about
as broadly as the old Roberts blanket, over virtually all out-ofcourt declarations. Unfortunately for them, the theories they
now press toward that end are not grounded in Crawford v.
Washington or its historically-based rationale that only
“testimonial” hearsay is covered by the Confrontation Clause.
These theories are instead based on wishful thinking about
what the reach of the Clause ought to be.
I submit that nothing in Crawford justifies this hope
that virtually all hearsay statements are still within the reach
of the Confrontation Clause. Some might now argue that the
whole point of the Clause is to draw witnesses into court. But
in Crawford, Justice Scalia said that the point of the Clause
was merely to exclude testimonial hearsay. 9 Some might also
contend that the Confrontation Clause would, if things were
nice, be interpreted to exclude anything that is “accusatory.”
But Justice Scalia said nothing like that in his opinion. Noble,
too, might be the goals of excluding hearsay that contains
“prosecution” information, or of preventing abuses of state
power. But you cannot get there, as a way to interpret the
Confrontation Clause, from the opinion in Crawford v.
Washington.
I am not saying that I am the only one who knows how
to read a case; but as I read Crawford, the Supreme Court has
defined “testimonial” hearsay so as to include only statements
resembling a narrow class of formal statements disfavored by
the common law by 1791 – statements that might have been
tolerated under a civil law system of a similar vintage. 10
Justice Scalia had in mind to exclude affidavits and prior
testimony. 11 The Court will also now consider admissions to
the police by co-defendants to be testimonial statements, but
that seems to be related to the fact, as per Justice Scalia, that
in Marian times magistrates interrogated suspects. 12 Thus,
station house interrogation that yields a statement is much
like a Marian magistrate’s inquiry, and the statement must be
considered court-like and “testimonial.”
That is about all that Crawford says is “testimonial.”
Excluded from Justice Scalia’s “testimonial” category, and thus
from Confrontation Clause protection, are statements
9
10
11
12

Id.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 51.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
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unrelated to the civil law “abuses” that the Justice is talking
about.
Placing other types of statements within this
“testimonial” category, to me, is simply wishful thinking.
There is nothing wrong with wishful thinking, and I am not
saying that any of these wishes are objectively bad. But these
wishes are not based on Crawford. Let me comment on just a
couple of the arguments that have been made for this wishfully
expansive view of “testimonial” hearsay.
One tactic is to say that a certain statement plainly
should not be let in at a trial, and to conclude without much
reasoning that the Confrontation Clause cannot be interpreted
to let it in. For example, civilian A, in order to get out of
testifying, might give a statement to civilian B, expecting B to
go to court and repeat it. And it would be horrible should B’s
hearsay testimony be admitted. As this theory goes, such
informal statements made without government involvement
must be included in the category of prohibited “testimonial”
statements. Thus, in defining “testimonial” statements, there
cannot be any rule that they be “formal” statements, or that
the government be involved in their production.
But I submit the conclusion does not follow. We all
agree that A’s statement to B should not come in at trial. But
to exclude the statement, it does not follow that we must call
the statement “testimonial,” despite its informality and the
lack of government involvement. At least in New York, I
predict, a “residue” of protection of the old Roberts blanket
“reliability” sort will remain, so that even non-testimonial
statements may be excluded under a state constitutional rule.
But on top of that, simple evidentiary hearsay rules will keep B
from testifying. His testimony would be hearsay anywhere.
If that is not right, still A’s statement to B is not
“testimonial” under the Crawford examples. Wishful thinking
will not change that. The devil’s bargain has been made. A
statement is not “testimonial,” and thus excludable under the
Confrontation Clause, simply because those in a pre-Crawford
mindset might not have thought that the Constitution should
tolerate its admission. The Confrontation Clause now excludes
only a limited category of formal hearsay statements
disapproved of in 1791, and not “non-testimonial” hearsay.
Other sources of protection must be sought, under state law for
example, if non-testimonial hearsay is to be deemed
inadmissible.
A second tactic to interpret Crawford expansively is to
take a “functional” approach. Rather than analogize to the
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several types of statements that the Supreme Court has said
are testimonial, this approach says that testimonial hearsay is
any statement made by a declarant who knows it will have a
law enforcement use. I submit that this approach is far too
broad. Perhaps one might define “testimonial” hearsay as
anything said to a law enforcement official that the declarant
thinks will be repeated at trial. But that is not to say that the
expectation by the declarant that a statement will serve any
law enforcement use is enough to make the statement
testimonial. If a robbery victim sees a cop coming and says,
“Officer, that man robbed me,” he has no thought except that
the criminal may be tackled and arrested. The victim has no
expectation whatsoever that his statement might be introduced
in a grand jury or at a trial. As I read Crawford, such a
statement is not testimonial unless given under the expectation
that it will serve as the equivalent of formal, in-court
testimony. There may still be an evidentiary hearsay problem
if the statement is offered at trial. But such a statement does
not look “testimonial” to me.
Relatedly, in New York, and I suspect elsewhere, the
hottest topic these days involves how to classify 911
statements. 13 Some 911 statements seem to be pure cries for
help; someone is bleeding and says, “Send an ambulance; he
just hit me.” As I see it, these statements bear no resemblance
to the “testimonial” statements that Justice Scalia is concerned
about in Crawford. They do not seem at all like the formal
statements admissible under civil law but not allowed into
common law criminal proceedings in 1791. You may say that
those statements should not come in because of traditional
hearsay rules. But that does not make them “testimonial”
under Crawford.
Finally, it also seems to me that there is almost an
equation to be made between declarations that are proper
excited utterances and statements that are not testimonial.
Perhaps the scope of the excited utterance hearsay exception
should be narrower than current cases say it is. But if a
statement is truly “excited” because it is made before the
opportunity to reflect – for example, to reflect on the chance
13

See, e.g., People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 2004); People v.
Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574 (Ct. App. 2004); Pitts v. State, 612 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App.
2005); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); People v. Moscat, 781
N.Y.S.2d 401 (Crim. Ct. 2004); People v. Cortes, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Crim. Ct. 2004);
State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
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that the statement will be admitted at a trial someday – then
by definition you cannot call the statement “testimonial.” If
hearsay rules do not exclude such a statement, after Crawford,
there is no reason why the Confrontation Clause should.

